Self and others in nonhuman primates: A question of perspective?

James R. Anderson

University of Stirling, UK

Almost three decades of research lead to conclusion that the capacity for mirror self-recognition is limited to a few species of nonhuman primates, most likely the great apes. Many attempts have been made to demonstrate self-recognition in monkeys, often using innovative techniques and scaffolding methods, but to no avail (Anderson & Gallup, 1999). There have also been suggestions that primates might differ in the level of self-recognition they attain, with the underlying assumption of some general or unitary "self" which is present to varying degrees. I will argue that a more useful approach is to look upon self as being multi-faceted, with primates showing a mosaic of competencies across these different kinds of self, which according to Neisser (1988) include the ecological, the interpersonal, the conceptual, the temporarily extended, and the private selves (Neisser, 1988). Although it is not yet entirely clear how mirror self-recognition is best characterized in this cluster of selves, there is increasing evidence for differences between great apes and monkeys in some interactions between them, including imitative abilities and empathy, both emotional and cognitive (Anderson, 1999). Cognitive empathy involves being able to picture oneself in another’s place, and should be associated mental attribution. Unlike great apes, monkeys do not appear to attribute cognitions to other individuals. Recent evidence comes from experiments in which primates can gain from taking the perspective of other individuals. Great apes, at least those with extensive experience with humans, make use of the information conveyed by eye direction, as do young human infants. Monkeys appear unable to do this (Anderson, 1998). I will suggest that the inability to self-recognize might be directly related to an inability to take on an alternative perspective.

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Anderson, J. R., & Gallup, G. G., Jr. (1999). Self-recognition in nonhuman primates: Past and future challenges. In M. Haug & R. E. Whalen (Eds.), Animal models of human emotion and cognition (pp. 175-194). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

Neisser, U. (1988). Five kinds of self-knowledge. Philosophical Psychology, 1, 35-59.

Anderson, James R.

Department of Psychology, University of Stirling

Stirling, Scotland FK9 4LA, UK

jra1@stir.ac.uk